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Non-proliferation
  The spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - nuclear-radiological, chemical and biological, the equipment and technologies required for their production and delivery systems - is one of the biggest threats to international peace and security. There is a danger that terrorist groups and sponsor states can obtain such weapons and materials. This process is called proliferation.

As potential suppliers, the states in possession of technologies, raw materials, experts, hold major responsibility for preventing the spread of WMD. Production of chemical and biological weapons requires relatively low-scale technology and financial resources, in addition it is hard to control the process, thus the prospect of their use poses a bigger menace.
Having joined the international non-proliferation treaties, Hungary is active in providing assistance to diminish the risks. It is vital to co-operate with the secret services of the nations holding similar values in combating this global danger.

Regarding non-proliferation, the law on the national security services has assigned duty only to the Information Office: "to gather information on (...) WMD, their components, and the illegal international trade of materials and equipment needed for their production." The starting point of this activity - the potential proliferators - as well as the end-users can usually be found abroad.

Proliferators do not usually want to buy entire weapons systems, they rather seek to obtain materials, equipment, production technologies that help the research, development and production of WMD, which makes the investigation rather difficult. The process of procurement is deeply covered. Were the connection between the procurement of the product and technology and its purpose to become more visible than it is intended, they would put in place more phases and front companies in the process of procurement. The front companies are shut down the moment they are uncovered, and new ones are established under new names in other places.
End-user certificates are more and more often fake. Proliferators frequently employ middlemen who at the same time carry out several legitimate transactions thus they can better conceal the unlawfulness of the business. Since the proliferators pay generously to the companies and individuals willing to illegally co-operate with them, they can always find candidates who take the risk. Finally it does not render the job any easier that in a number of cases the secret services of the proliferator states also take active part in the procurement.




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National security files